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INTRODUCTION
When the United States federal government entered a shutdown in
the fall of 2013, the budget crisis took center stage in the political
debate.  The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was one of the most conten-
tious issues on the agenda, and among the bargaining chips in the dis-
cussion was the disputed issue of the medical device excise tax
(“MDET”).  The excise tax, imposed upon the sale of certain medical
devices, has raised quite a bit of bipartisan opposition and has been up
for repeal or reform over a dozen times to date.  The increasing atten-
tion the tax has received since its inception, and especially since it
became a part of the fiscal fight, has raised concerns from numerous
sources over both the tax itself and its structure.  The medical device
industry is adamant that the MDET will have crippling effects on the
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industry, by forcing firms to cut jobs, spending on innovation, and in
some cases, operations all together.  The federal government, on the
other hand, argues the MDET is a fair method of taxation, as the medi-
cal device industry will receive a windfall from the increase in revenue
when the ACA requires millions of uninsured Americans to start buying
health insurance.
This Note will present the issues raised by both sides of the debate,
but will also posit that there are considerations missing from the discus-
sion that, while indeterminable in their effects right now, must be pre-
sent in the conversation in the future to determine if this use of an
excise tax is an efficient and effective means of taxation.  Most impor-
tantly, those discussions will be significantly affected by where the eco-
nomic burden of the tax lands.  In other words, when deciding the fate
of the tax in the future, it will be crucial to know who is “paying” for the
tax—the manufacturers, or the various consumers?  However, until
there is more of a consensus on the effects of the tax, none of the argu-
ments presented by either side can be properly evaluated.
This Note starts in Part I by first defining what an excise tax is, and
then moving into the more particular details of the MDET itself, includ-
ing the legislation that enacted it, what qualifies for the tax (and what
does not), and the purpose of the tax.  Part I will close with a discussion
of the relevance of the tax in the current political debate, before mov-
ing into a more in-depth discussion of the tax structure in Part II.  Part
II begins with a focus on the traditional rationales behind the excise tax
structure and why the MDET does not fit these molds.  It will then pre-
sent the specific arguments for and against the MDET, as advocated by
the medical device industry and the U.S. federal government.  Finally,
in Part III, this Note will take a forward-looking approach to the MDET
by discussing the factors that will be important to include in later dis-
cussions about the future of the MDET.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Excise Tax
An excise tax is defined as a “direct and fixed charge placed on
[specific] goods.”1  It is typically levied against the manufacturer or pro-
ducer for sale of the select product or good; because it is narrowly
based, it is often described as a “selective sales tax.”2  Excise taxes are
applied on either a per unit or ad valorem basis;3 gasoline, alcohol and
cigarette excise taxes, which are commonly associated with the classic
structure of an excise tax, are applied on a per-unit basis.4  The excise
tax structure is utilized by both federal and state governments, and is
typically a large source of revenue for both.5
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (9th ed. 2009).
2. J. Fred Giertz, Excise Taxes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY
125, 125 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 126.
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Taxes, regardless of their form, are structured in a way designed to
raise revenue, but often are justified in their use by specific reasons or
rationales.  Excise taxes are no different, and can be explained by a
variety of traditional arguments.  These will be explained in greater
detail later in this Note,6 but for purposes of framing the tax, common
justifications for the use of an excise tax are introduced here.  The
excise tax structure is often employed as an easily administered form
with which to raise revenue, as the tax is applied to a narrowly-defined
product base, usually in a structured marketplace.7  Traditionally,
excise taxes have been described as a form of indirect taxation, which
by definition means that the tax is collected from the manufacturer or
producer of the good, but the burden, or economic incidence, of the
tax is expected to be shifted to the consumer.8  For example, the ulti-
mate economic burden of paying for an excise tax on cigarettes is
passed on from the manufacturer to the consumer through an increase
in the final sale price of the cigarettes.  Unlike a sales tax, which
appears as a separate line item on a consumer receipt, excise taxes are
applied directly to the manufacturer as a percentage of their sales price,
but are often passed onto the consumer by an increase in the final sale
price of the good, making the tax less recognizable by the final con-
sumer and thus more appealing to government officials who are gener-
ally opposed to raising taxes.9  Because of the traditional ease of
shifting the economic burden of the tax to the final consumer, excise
taxes are also very commonly known for their application when the gov-
ernment is seeking to change behavior.10  From the first excise tax in
the United States, which was levied against whiskey distributors in 1791,
to the current tax on cigarettes, alcohol, and airline travel, selective
excise taxes have traditionally been applied to goods or services that are
considered harmful or undesirable in an attempt to discourage con-
sumption or punish the consumer; in this regard they are often
referred to as “sin taxes.”11  The one exception was the selective excise
tax applied to crude oil in 1979—the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act
of 1979.  This excise tax was justified by the politicians who enacted it
by using a windfall argument.  In other words, it was stated that the oil
companies ought to be taxed for their expected increases in revenue
6. Infra Part II.A.
7. See Giertz, supra note 2, at 125.
8. John H. Bowman, Excise Taxation, in HANDBOOK ON TAXATION 677, 677 (W. Bar-
tley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999); see also Giertz, supra note 2, at 125.
9. How Sales and Excise Taxes Work, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y, at 2 (Aug.
2011); see also Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Robert M. McNab, Tax Systems in Transition Eco-
nomics, in HANDBOOK ON TAXATION 911, 922 (W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson
eds., 1999) (stating that “[i]ndirect taxes are typically much easier to legislate in an
acceptable format and also much easier to enforce than direct taxes”).
10. Richard Williams & Katelyn Christ, Taxing Sins: Are Excise Taxes Efficient?, 52
MERCATUS ON POLICY 1, 2 (2009).
11. Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical Perspective, in TAXING CHOICE: THE
PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 52–53 (William F. Shughart II ed.,
1997).  Excise taxes have a long-standing historical tradition of being used to change or
influence behavior in the United States.
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generated by government decontrol of domestic oil prices.12  The
major difference between the windfall profit tax and the others was
upon whom the government seemed to want to place the economic
burden of the tax.  This tension, even in the two rationales commonly
associated with excise taxes, foreshadows the tension that will be identi-
fied in the MDET.  While most excise taxes are typically explained by
the traditional rationale of an indirect tax (i.e. one where the economic
burden is expected to be passed to the consumer through an increase
in the final price of the good), this is not true of the windfall profits
excise tax,13 and may not be true of the MDET either.  Rather, it
remains a key tension in the rationale underlying the use of a selective
excise tax, and one that will be crucial in the discussion of the MDET—
who will ultimately “pay” for the tax?14  The answer to this question will
help both in determining the future of the tax, and in substantiating
the underlying rationales confirming the choice of an excise tax
structure.
B. The Medical Device Excise Tax
Following the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act in January 2010 (“PPACA”),15 the Health Care and Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010 (“HCERA”) established a 2.3 percent tax on all qualify-
ing medical devices16 that was one of many additional revenue-raising
provisions to finance the new health care reform.17  Pursuant to the
new section 1405 of the HCERA, entitled “Excise Tax on Medical
Device Manufacturers,”18 the Internal Revenue Code was amended to
add Section 4191, which imposed a 2.3 percent excise tax on the sale of
12. Id. at 51.  The windfall-profits tax was explained in a report to Congress in the
following way: “The revenues resulting from these higher prices [due to deregulation of
prices] would provide income to oil producers far in excess of what most of them origi-
nally anticipated. . . . Thus, the committee believes that the additional revenues received
by oil producers . . . are an appropriate object of taxation.” Id.
13. The exception is the windfall-profits tax on oil, which was arguably meant to
stick with the domestic manufacturers/producers of oil.
14. Even defining the actors is difficult—passing the economic burden of the tax
along and away from the manufacturers only really tells part of the story. Multiple factors
and numerous players can impact the outcome; for example, the slope of the demand
curves may vary drastically depending on whether the party is a patient, an insurance
company, or even a hospital group.
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
16. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
17. The HCERA made important changes to the PPACA, but both laws were signed.
Often, references to both the PPACA and HCERA are necessary, as is the case in the
remainder of this Note.  Thus, for the remainder of this Note, references will be made to
the “Affordable Care Act” (“ACA”), which is often used as short hand or even as an unoffi-
cial title for the health care reform from the combined PPACA and HCERA.  Beyond this
section, the health care reform will be referred to as the ACA. See John McDonough, ACA
vs. ObamaCare: What’s In a Name?, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 14, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www
.boston.com/lifestyle/health/health_stew/2012/01/aca_vs_obamacare_whats_in_a_na
.html.
18. § 1405, 124 Stat. at 1064.
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certain medical devices, to be collected from the manufacturer or
importer of the device.19  The tax applies to the wholesale price of any
taxable medical device when it is first sold, leased, rented, or used by
the manufacturer or importer.20  The MDET attaches to any sale made
after December 31, 2012, with all penalties and reporting rules gov-
erned by the Internal Revenue Code (“IRS”).21
1. Definition: What Qualifies and What Does Not
Section 4191 of the Internal Revenue Code, although brief,
imposes the MDET’s regulations as applied to the sale of certain medi-
cal devices.  Based on the language of the statute, the MDET is
“imposed on the sale of any taxable medical device by the manufac-
turer, producer, or importer” at a rate of 2.3 percent of the price for
which the device is sold.22  The Code goes on to further define a “taxa-
ble medical device” as any “device,” defined in §201(h) of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”),23 intended for humans.24
Finally, there is a list of explicit exemptions from the taxable devices,
which includes “eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and any other
medical device determined by the Secretary to be of a type which is
generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use.”25
The text is simple and uncomplicated, but the application is not; in
response to many questions and comments, the Department of the
Treasury and the IRS have issued final regulations seeking to explain
the scope of the medical device tax, both in terms of its application and
exclusions.26
The details in application of the tax are still being reviewed in
select grey areas, but it is important for this Note’s purpose to under-
stand the general application of the tax, because some of the argu-
ments raised in opposition to the MDET are unfortunately based on
misunderstandings of its use.  For example, one fear expressed by the
general public and medical device lobbying firms alike is the fear of
driving manufacturing and production of medical devices overseas to
avoid the tax.27  This fear, however, is completely unfounded because
19. I.R.C. § 4191 (West Supp. 2010).
20. Implementing the Medical Device Excise Tax, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (Nov. 21. 2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Technical_Line_Implementing_the_medi
cal_device_excise_tax/$FILE/TechnicalLine_BB2439_MedDeviceExcise_Tax_21Novem
ber2012.pdf.
21. Medical Device Excise Tax: Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Medical-Device-Excise-Tax:-Frequently-Asked-Questions (last
updated Feb. 3, 2014).
22. I.R.C. § 4191(a).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006).
24. I.R.C. § 4191.
25. § 4191(b)(2).
26. JANE G. GRAVELLE & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43342, THE MEDICAL
DEVICE EXCISE TAX: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013).
27. DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, ADVANCED MED. TECH.
ASSOC., EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE NEW EXCISE TAX ON THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY 1,
7–9 (2011).  The study sponsored by Advanced Medical Technology Association
(“AdvaMed”), noted that, while it was impossible to predict the exact impact of the medi-
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the text of the statute states that the MDET will be imposed on the “sale
of any medical device by the manufacturer, producer, or importer of the
device.”28  In addition, devices produced in the United States for
exports are exempt from the tax, thus dispelling any truth to the fear
that the MDET will drive manufacturers overseas.29
The guidance provided by both the IRS and Treasury Department
on the application of I.R.C. § 4191 may be broken down into two broad
areas of expressed concern regarding the implementation of the
MDET.  The first may be labeled as inquiries about the type of good to
which the MDET attaches.  As stated above, the 2.3 percent excise tax
applies to the “sale of any taxable medical device,”30 which is then
defined further in I.R.C. section 4191(b).31  But the regulations do not
list all applicable medical devices to which the tax applies; instead, they
link the definition of “taxable medical device” to section 201(h) of the
FFDCA with the caveat that the device must be intended for human
use.32  This qualification is included because section 201(h) of the
FFDCA provides generally that:
[T]he term “device” . . . means an instrument, apparatus . . . [that
is] intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other condi-
tions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of dis-
ease, in man or other animals, or intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man . . . and which does not achieve
its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or
on the body of man . . . and which is not dependent upon being
cal device excise tax, “some manufacturing of medical devices may shift offshore as a
result of the new excise tax to minimize losses.” Id. at 7.  Then, without citing any addi-
tional sources other than their own study, it was estimated that they could make “a con-
servative assumption that 10% of manufacturing activities [will move] offshore.” Id. at 9.
28. I.R.C. § 4191(a); see also Christopher Flavelle, How Much Will the Medical Device
Tax Hurt?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2012-03-22/how-much-will-the-medical-device-tax-hurt.  This was just one of
numerous articles that pointed out the overstatements or incorrect assumptions made by
medical device firms and lobbyists, noting that the statute creates no incentive to move
production overseas because the tax applies to all covered products sold in the U.S.,
regardless of origin of manufacture.  In particular, the articles criticized a 2011 study by
AdvaMed, a trade association representing over 80 medical technology firms in the
United States, which has been continuously cited for numerous misstatements of tax,
often used by others in the medical device industry. See FURCHTGOTT-ROTH &
FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 27.  The methodology and the corresponding results have
been repeatedly questioned and criticized for overstating potential results of the MDET,
in addition to making false claims with little to no justification behind such outcomes. See
Paul N. Van de Water, Excise Tax on Medical Devices Should Not be Repealed Industry Lobbyists
Distort Tax’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/
?fa=view&id=3684 (last updated Oct. 2, 2013) (noting that the tax will not cause manufac-
turers to shift overseas because “[t]he tax applies equally to imported and domestically
produced devices,” also noting that the AdvaMed study is “not credible”).
29. See Van de Water, supra note 28 (competitiveness of U.S. medical technology
firms will not be reduced by the tax, as the MDET only applies to the sale of devices in the
United States, not the origin of production).
30. I.R.C. § 4191(a).
31. § 4191(b).
32. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 72925 (Dec. 7, 2012) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 48).
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metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.33
The text of I.R.C. section 4191 also includes a non-exclusive list of
exemptions, including eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and “any
other medical device determined by the Secretary to be of a type that is
generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use,”34
which is otherwise known as the “retail exemption.”35  According to the
final regulations, those devices that qualify under the retail exemption
may be determined by one of several options; the final regulations
include a safe harbor provision that identifies certain categories of med-
ical devices that the IRS and the Treasury Department have determined
fall within the exemption.36  In addition, the final regulations have
incorporated a facts and circumstances approach to evaluating whether
a device is considered to be a type generally purchased by the public at
retail for individual use, often known colloquially as items available for
sale “over the counter.”37  It follows that such an instrument qualifies as
exempt if “(i) the device is regularly available for purchase and use by
individual consumers who are not medical professionals, and (ii) the
device’s design demonstrates that it is not primarily intended for use in
a medical institution or office, or by medical professionals.”38
33. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006) (emphasis added).
34. I.R.C. § 4191.
35. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72927.
36. Id.  The safe harbor includes items that qualify as “over the counter” products,
as identified by the following three sources: OTC—Over the Counter, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfIVD/Search.cfm (last
updated Jan. 20, 2014) (any devices listed in this database by the FDA qualify for the safe
harbor from the MDET); Product Classification, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/classification.cfm (last updated Jan. 20,
2014) (qualifying devices include devices described as ‘‘OTC’’ or ‘‘over the counter’’
devices in the relevant FDA classification regulation heading); Establishment Registration &
Device Listing, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/
cfdocs/cfrl/rl.cfm (last updated Jan. 20, 2014) (any devices described as “OTC” or “over
the counter” in this database, by product code name, the FDA’s classification regulation
heading, or the classification name field in the FDA’s device registration and listing
database).
37. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72927.
38. Id. The proposed regulations, adopted as final, additionally set out a list of both
positive and negative factors to be considered when determining whether a device quali-
fies as exempt from the MDET.  The positive factors, which help determine if the device is
regularly available for purchase and use by individuals posits a nonexclusive list of factors,
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
(i) whether consumers who are not medical professionals can purchase the
device through retail businesses that also sell items other than medical devices,
including drug stores, supermarkets, and similar vendors; (ii) whether consum-
ers who are not medical professionals can safely and effectively use the device
for its intended medical purpose with minimal or no training from a medical
professional; and (iii) whether the device is classified by the FDA under Subpart
D of 21 CFR part.
Id.  Negative factors to consider in determining if the design of a device demonstrates its
primary intended use is in a medical institution or as by a medical professional, and thus
not intended for individual consumer purchase, include, but again are not limited to:
(i) whether the device generally must be implanted, inserted, operated, or oth-
erwise administered by a medical professional; (ii) whether the cost to acquire,
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The second area broadly focused on by both the IRS and the Trea-
sury Department, in their guidance on the application of the MDET,
addresses the entity responsible for paying the MDET for a qualifying
device.  According to I.R.C. section 4191, the MDET is imposed on the
“sale of any taxable medical device by the manufacturer, producer, or
importer [at] a tax equal to 2.3 percent of the price for which so sold.”39  A
“manufacturer” is generally defined as “any person who produces a tax-
able article from scrap, salvage, or junk material, or from new or raw
material, by processing, manipulating, or changing the form of an arti-
cle or by combining or assembling two or more articles.”40  Anyone
importing a taxable good into the United States is also liable for pay-
ment of the MDET, as an “importer.”41  The sale and price of the taxa-
ble article has been a hotly debated topic since the tax’s first
introduction.  They are defined, for purposes of the statute, in the defi-
nition of a sale, thereinafter described as “an agreement whereby the
seller transfers the property (that is, the title or the substantial incidents
of ownership) in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the
price, which may consist of money, services, or other things.”42  Many
commenters submitted requests related to sale and price, but the gui-
dance provided has largely denied attempts to create a blanket rule on
maintain, and/or use the device requires a large initial investment and/ or
ongoing expenditure that is not affordable for the average consumer; (iii)
whether the device is a Class III device under the FDA system of classification;
(iv) whether the device is classified by the FDA under certain enumerated parts
or subparts of 21 CFR; and (v) whether the device qualifies as durable medical
equipment (DME), prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (collectively, DMEPOS)
for which payment is available exclusively on a rental basis under the Medicare
Part B payment rules and is an ‘‘item requiring frequent and substantial servic-
ing’’ as defined in 42 CFR 414.222 890 (Physical Medicine Devices).
Id.  The final regulations clarify that not every one of these factors must be met in the
course of a facts and circumstances test, and that additional factors may also be relevant.
39. I.R.C. § 4191(a) (emphasis added).
40. 26 C.F.R. § 48.0-2(a)(4)(i) (2000).  In responding to many of the comments
submitted to the IRS, the IRS and Treasury Department staff noted that one commenter
had requested the final regulations of section 4191 include a presumption such that a
manufacturer merely be defined as anyone who lists a device with the FDA.  However, the
final regulations refused to adopt such a definition, instead responding that longstanding
rules defining the terms “manufacturer” and “importer” for chapter 32 purposes had
been built over the years through a combination of statutory and regulatory provisions,
published guidance, and case law.  Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72930.
41. 26 C.F.R. § 48.0-2(a)(4)(i) (adding that “[i]f the nominal importer of a taxable
article is not its beneficial owner (for example, the nominal importer is a customs broker
engaged by the beneficial owner), the beneficial owner is the ‘importer’ of the article for
purposes of chapter 32 and is liable for tax on his sale or use of the article in the United
States”); see also I.R.C. § 4219 (which, along with the regulations thereunder, covers any
circumstances under which sales by persons other than the manufacturer or importer are
subject to the manufacturers excise tax); 26 C.F.R. § 48.0-2(a)(4)(ii) (explaining that
someone other than the person who actually manufactured or produced the taxable arti-
cle might be considered the manufacturer for purposes of the tax, such as “where a per-
son manufactures or produces a taxable article for another person who furnishes
materials under an agreement whereby the person who furnished the materials retains
title thereto and to the finished article. . . .”).
42. 26 C.F.R. § 48.0-2(a)(5).
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price setting, either to the favor of buyers or manufacturers.43  Thus,
the result has been that guidance provided on who qualifies as a manu-
facturer (and an importer or producer) has been largely flushed out,
while determinations of price and defining a sale remain topics of con-
versation and debate which the IRS and Treasury Department are still
issuing assistance on.
Other important topics have been addressed by final regulations
and interim guidance related to the application of the MDET.  A few of
the clarifications important to point out include the following: replace-
ment parts for qualifying taxable devices will be subject to the tax, even
if listed separately as distinct devices by the FDA;44 the tax will attach in
the case of a sale made on credit, regardless of whether or not the
purchase price is actually collected;45 but the “donation of a taxable
medical device by the manufacturer of the device to an eligible donee will
not constitute a taxable use.”46
2. Purpose
The major justification offered for the medical device tax is its rev-
enue, which will help to offset the cost of health care reform, as estab-
lished by the ACA.47  According to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
43. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72930-31.  Concerns over the final sale
price of taxable devices permeated the comments received by the IRS on section 4191.  In
response, the IRS and Treasury Department noted their awareness of implementation
issues the medical device industry was likely to face from the tax, but the IRS expressed
their intention to “work with stakeholders on compliance-related issues, such as the deter-
mination of price.” Id. at 72930.  Many commenters requested that the principles of Rev-
enue Ruling 80-273 be extended to taxable medical devices, which states that “when a
manufacturer or importer sells a taxable article directly to an unrelated end user at retail,
the excise tax may be based on a sale price of seventy-five percent of the retail sale price,
after any adjustments under section 4216(a), such as for containers, packing, and trans-
portation charges.” Id.  However, revenue rulings are meant to only apply to a specific set
of circumstances, and even then are not binding on the IRS, which gave them reason
enough to deny that the reasoning of the Revenue Ruling be extended to taxable medical
devices.  The guidance on the regulations also made clear that strict rules used to deter-
mine transfer pricing under section 428 could not be directly applied to determine the
sales price of taxable medical devices. Id.
44. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72932 (explaining that the tax will be
applied to the actual amount paid, if any, on products under warranty and if not under
warranty, replacement and new parts, which are listed with the FDA under section 510(j)
of the FFDCA and 21 CFR part 807, will generally be considered taxable).
45. 26 C.F.R. § 48.0-2(b)(3).
46. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, 2012-52 I.R.B. 781.  The IRS Notice provided interim
rules governing the excise tax treatment of donations of taxable medical devices to cer-
tain organizations, which may be relied upon since the IRS and Treasury Department
have not issued further guidance on the issue since the Internal Revenue Bulletin was
issued on Dec. 27, 2012.  The Notice provides that qualifying taxable medical devices,
when donated to an organization qualifying for federal tax exemption under I.R.C.
§ 170(c) as a charitable organization, will not subject the manufacturer that is donating to
the MDET.  The manufacturer qualifying for this safe harbor will not be held liable for
the tax, unless at the time of donation they knew or had reason to know that the organiza-
tion receiving the donation was not an eligible donee (i.e. did not qualify as tax exempt
under § 170(c)) or that the article donated was to be resold by the eligible donee.
47. ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42971, THE MEDICAL DEVICE EXCISE
TAX: A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2013).
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the MDET is estimated to raise $20 billion by 2019,48 with other sources
estimating between $20 to $40 billion in the first ten years the tax will
be in effect.49
While the MDET has caused a lot of bipartisan tension, the tax
actually only purports to raise about two percent of the revenue neces-
sary to fund the health care reform.50  Although the estimated budgets
for the ACA continue to grow, Congress was careful to design the ACA
so that it would not add to the already growing federal budget deficit.
To help pay for the expansion of health care coverage to over 27 mil-
lion uninsured Americans, the Congressional plan divided funds
between two broad sources: cuts in government spending, and new pro-
visions to raise revenue.51  Some of the new provisions, including the
MDET, were justified as increases in taxes to industries that will benefit
from the health care reform.52  Thus, the other significant justification
for the tax is the argument that the medical device industry is among
those commercial interests that arguably stand “to benefit from unan-
ticipated profits as more individuals enroll in health care insurance.”53
This justification of a “windfall” from the increased number of products
will depend heavily on the impact of both the ACA, in terms of increas-
48. Estimated Revenue Effects of the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 4872,
the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” as Amended, in Combination with the Revenue Effects of H.R.
3590, the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”),” as Passed by the Senate, and
Scheduled for Consideration by the House Committee on Rules on March 20, 2010, THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAX’N (Mar. 20, 2010), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start
down&id=3672.
49. GRAVELLE & LOWRY, supra note 26 (reporting that the MDET is projected to
“collect approximately $38 billion of excise tax revenues over the next 10 years, resulting
in $29 billion of net revenues, after accounting for offsets from other taxes”); see also
Interview by Carey Goldberg with Brian Johnson, Publisher and Co-Founder of Mass-
Device.com, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 30, 2013, 1:40 PM), http://commonhealth.wbur
.org/2013/09/medical-device-tax-repeal (estimating that the tax will generate about $30
billion in income for the federal government over the next ten years); Heather Mayer,
Device Tax to Cut Jobs, Raise Prices, Survey Says, DOTMED NEWS (May 6, 2010), http://www
.dotmed.com/news/story/12589/?lang=en (MDET “slated to raise $20 billion to help pay
for health care reform”).
50. Sarah Kliff, How Congress Paid for Obamacare (In Two Charts), WASH. POST (Aug.
30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/08/30/how-con
gress-paid-for-obamacare-in-two-charts/.
51. Id.
52. See Van de Water, supra note 28.  Most famously, the “windfall” justification of
an excise tax was used by Congress when they passed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax in
1980 in response to the deregulation of oil prices.  In a statement by the Joint Committee
on Taxation, it was announced that “Congress believed that the large price increases
resulting from the phased decontrol and extraordinary increase in world oil prices were
an appropriate object of taxation.” JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980, 6 (1981).  Although not on
account of a deregulation of price control, this congressional justification for the MDET
relies on the idea that a government imposed regulation (mandatory, universal health
care coverage) will provide an increase in profits to the medical device industry, as more
consumers of the devices enter the market. See infra note 54 for the counter arguments.
53. GRAVELLE & LOWRY, supra note 26. The medical device industry was not the only
industry singled out for an increase in taxes; a wide range of other industries will also see
an increase in taxes, including hospitals, home health agencies, clinical laboratories,
health insurance providers, and drug companies. See Van de Water, supra note 28.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-2\NDE207.txt unknown Seq: 11 20-APR-15 16:12
2015] EVALUATING THE NON-TRADITIONAL MEDICAL DEVICE EXCISE TAX 507
ing the potential consumer base for the medical devices covered by this
tax, and who bears the ultimate economic burden of the tax.54  It is still
too early on to conclusively state that this purported windfall will
smooth out or eliminate the possible negative externalities of the tax.55
However, an increase in the demand for the products taxed by the
MDET remains a justification for the tax imposed on the sale of medi-
cal devices.56
3. How the MDET Made it to the Center of the Political Debate
From October 1–16, 2013, the U.S. federal government entered a
shutdown and curtailed most routine operations after Congress failed
to enact legislation appropriating funds for the fiscal year 2014.57
Although it was originally proposed with limited public knowledge as a
method of raising revenue for the ACA in 2010, the medical device tax
grew in unpopularity to become one of several bargaining chips in the
54. See supra note 52, for reasons why the ACA may not actually increase the con-
sumer base for the products taxed by the MDET. The economic burden of the tax will
also impact the “windfall” justification of the MDET.  We currently do not know who will
maintain market power following the full implementation of the ACA (i.e. will the hospi-
tals and insurance companies gain market power such that they can repel any attempts by
the medical device industries to increase the price of their devices in response to the
tax?), nor do we have a complete picture of the elasticities of the demand curves for each
of the products being taxed.  This is especially pertinent information, as it will effectively
determine if the economic burden of the tax will stick with the manufacturers of the
devices, or will be passed onto the hospitals, insurance groups or even the final patients
through an increase in the cost of the devices or procedures as necessary compliments to
the devices.  There remains a significant amount of tension in such a discussion, as the
ultimate economic impact of the tax will effectively determine if these discussions are
moot.  In other words, if the economic burden of the tax shifts from the manufacturer to
another party down the chain of sales, is the MDET effectively justified by the “windfall”
rationale?
55. While the justification remains strong, there are several points to make that may
undercut the actuality of this justification.  Opponents to this rationale for the tax argue
that the “windfall” effect will be negligible for several reasons.  First, a number of the
items upon which the tax will be imposed are disproportionately used by Medicare
patients because they address the consequences of aging.  Second, they argue that those
in need of big-ticket items are also those most likely to already have health insurance.  In
other words, the people who will be forced to obtain health insurance because of the
mandatory requirements are not those that will be most inclined to need to purchase
many of the items taxed by the MDET.  And finally, other government influences in the
health care system, including the new reforms, will increase the power of hospitals, thus
increasing their market power and reducing the medical device industry’s ability to main-
tain price control in the market. See John R. Graham, Obamacare’s Medical-Device Excise
Tax: Early Evidence Suggests Significant Harm, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/09/14/obamacares-medical-device-excise-
tax-early-evidence-suggests-significant-harm/.  Note that the negative externalities men-
tioned here include the purported job loss and elimination of R&D budgets the medical
device industry cites as justifications for repeal of the MDET.
56. Michael Hiltzik, Save Obamacare’s Medical Device Tax!, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/03/business/la-fi-mh-device-tax-20131003.
57. Brad Plumer, Absolutely Everything You Need to Know About How the Government
Shutdown Will Work, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/30/absolutely-everything-you-need-to-know-about-
how-the-government-shutdown-will-work/.
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budget crisis on the Hill during the 2013 shutdown.58  Even prior to the
shutdown, the tax had been up for Congressional repeal seventeen
times between January 25, 2011 and September 29, 2013.59  Its biparti-
san opposition is attributed to the aggressive lobbying by the medical
device industry.60  The industry’s lobbyists have been credited with
heavily impacting the political debate surrounding implementation of
the tax through numerous efforts to direct their congressional repre-
sentatives towards estimated negative effects of the tax.61  But the tax
has survived many attempts at repeal because it also has the most pow-
erful friend in Washington: President Obama, who has promised to
veto any bill containing a repeal of the tax.62  Despite this promise from
the President, the tax remains a topic of conversation and of potential
compromise on the Hill.63
II. DISCUSSION—ANALYSIS OF THE TAX STRUCTURE
A. Not Your Traditional Excise Tax—Theoretical Application
of the Tax Structure
Taxes on choice or specific goods are often defended by their pro-
ponents as devices intended merely to raise revenue.  As noted earlier,
the MDET itself is heavily defended by the amount of revenue it is
anticipated to generate.64  However, the desire, and even the need by
58. Peter Overby, Why A Medical Device Tax Became Part of the Fiscal Fight, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:56 PM) (downloaded at http://www.npr.org/2013/10/15/
234864058/why-a-medical-device-tax-became-part-of-the-fiscal-fight).
59. NOLAN, supra note 47, at 11–12 (providing a list of all proposals to fully repeal
the medical device excise tax during the 112th and 113th Congresses).
60. Tony Pugh, Health Care Law, Medical Device Tax Survive Shutdown Debate,
MCCLATCHY DC (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/10/17/205740/
health-care-law-medical-device.html (noting that some congressmen in both the House
and Senate, and on both sides of the aisle, have shifted their position on the tax as lobby-
ing efforts have increased, the diverse impact attributable to the “sprinkling of device
makers across a wide swath of states”). In fact, the industry lobbyists have already had a
significant impact on the face of the tax, as their efforts are credited for an initial reduc-
tion in the percentage size of the tax, which halved the tax, taking it from 4.6 to 2.3
percent. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Mark Leahey, president and CEO of the Medical Device Manufac-
turers Association, “[m]ore and more members of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives are learning about the devastating impact the medical device tax has on innovation,
jobs and patient care,” in explaining why the efforts of his lobbyists will not let up); cf.
Paul N. Van de Water, More Bogus Economics from the Medical Device Industry, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 30, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.offthechartsblog
.org/more-bogus-economics-from-the-medical-device-industry/ (one of numerous media
sources highlighting the overdramatized effects of the MDET on the medical device
industry, calling studies and overblown result expectations “not credible”).
62. Goldberg, supra note 49. Former Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee (D-Montana), is the father of the tax, having been involved in its
inception in 2009.  Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nevada) is also notably invested
and has no interest in bringing a repeal bill to a vote because he helped broker a deal to
cut the tax in half in 2009.
63. Marc Heller, Senate Finance Committee Oks Two-Year Extension of Most Expired Tax
Provisions, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.bna.com/senate-finance-commit
tee-n17179889451/.
64. NOLAN, supra note 47.
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government to raise revenue, only tells part of the story behind deci-
sions to tax.  Both economic and political influences are involved in the
ultimate decision on how to structure taxes; additional influences and
rationale always underlie the tax structure chosen.  An excise tax is no
different, and as noted earlier, may be described by a host of traditional
rationale.
Excise taxes are a prime example of what have traditionally been
referred to as indirect taxes.65  The tax, which is imposed on the sale of
a select good, is indirect because the economic burden of the tax typi-
cally falls upon persons other than the one from whom the tax is
directly collected from.66  Thus, one of the common features of most
selective excise taxes is that the tax’s economic incidence (or ultimate
economic burden of paying the tax) is often expected to be shifted
from the original taxpayer to the consumer through an increase in
price.67  The crucial thing to understand is that the tax’s economic inci-
dence is not dependent on where the revenue is collected, but rather
depends on the price elasticity of demand and supply of the good being
taxed.68  These concepts are best explained by looking at a streamlined
example in the context of an excise tax.  Elastic goods are goods with
many substitutes; for simplified purposes, assume that an excise tax is
levied against wine, while beer and liquor are considered to be ade-
quate substitutes.  If an excise tax was levied against the manufacturers
of wine, the economic incidence of the tax would be borne by the man-
ufacturer; if the manufacturer were to try to raise the price of wine to
make up for the increase in cost it experiences because of the tax, con-
sumers could just switch to any of the various substitutes, such as beer
or liquor.69  Thus, an elastic good can be identified by the fact that a
65. Giertz, supra note 2, at 125; see also Jorge Martinez-Vazquez et al., Direct Versus
Indirect Taxation: Trends, Theory, and Economic Significance (Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young
Sch. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/
isp/files/ispwp0911_updated.pdf (While direct taxes are often described as “those that
may be adjusted to the individual characteristics of a taxpayer,” an indirect tax is
described as “those that are levied on transactions irrespective of the circumstances of
[the] buyer or seller.”).
66. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 257 (14th ed. 2010); see also Giertz, supra note 2,
at 125 (noting that excise taxes may be collected at various stages, including the point of
production, wholesale or retail levels, but that the tax is ultimately imposed on a transac-
tion (such as the sale of the good), rather than a person or corporation directly (i.e. an
income tax), but that there is traditionally expected to be a difference between the point
of collection and who ultimately pays for the tax).
67. See generally Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence 28 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8829, 2002) (“[T]he standard assumption is that
the burdens [of the tax] fall on the consumers of the taxed products (through higher
prices).”).
68. Bowman, supra note 8, at 677–a.
69. Although this is not a perfect example, as beer and liquor are arguably not
perfect substitutes for many people who prefer wine, it does have some basis grounded in
historical context.  In reviewing common reactions to sin taxes, substitution of similar
nontaxed products reveals that the high tax on whiskey in the U.S. in the late 1800’s
caused many people simply to switch to beer, and others to opium and marijuana. Adam
Gifford Jr., Whiskey, Margarine, and Newspapers: A Tale of Three Taxes, in TAXING CHOICE:
THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 57, 58 (William F. Shughart II ed.,
1997).
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slight change in price typically leads to a sharp change in the quantity
demanded or supplied.70  In contrast, goods that are said to be inelastic
have relatively few substitutes—although simplified for purposes of this
hypothetical, consider cigarettes to be the only satisfactory product that
smokers are willing to buy.  If the tax is again levied against the manu-
facturer, the cigarette manufacturer in this case has the ability to pass
on the economic incidence of the tax to the final consumer by increas-
ing the price of cigarettes.  Because cigarettes are assumed to have no
acceptable substitute, consumers would have to either buy the ciga-
rettes at the new higher price, or change their consumption habits.
Consumer habits can thus be affected by the shift in the economic bur-
den of a the tax on an inelastic good, especially if the good is not con-
sidered a “necessity.”71  Therefore, in the interest of raising revenue,
excise taxes are arguably best applied to inelastic goods.
Based on the aforementioned reasons, imposing an excise tax on
certain goods would seem like an effective method of raising revenue
for the government, especially when the good is considered to be
inelastic.  But as noted above, the ability to raise revenue rarely consti-
tutes the complete picture for justifying a certain tax structure.  And yet
it is important to first understand why application of an excise tax is
most efficiently applied (in terms of revenue raising) to an inelastic
good because the two possible outcomes of a price increase to an inelas-
tic good (increasing the price of consuming the good/changing con-
sumption habits) are also two of the strongest traditional rationales for
choosing an excise tax structure.  These are also the traditional justifica-
tions that have made excise taxes a popular tool for politicians; first, an
excise tax that attaches to an inelastic good at the production level can
typically be passed on to the consumer through an increase in the price
of the good, without adding the additional cost as a separate line item
on the consumer’s receipt, and second, because an excise tax levied
against a good with few substitutes can be an effective method of chang-
ing consumer buying habits, an excise tax can be used to change con-
sumption habits.  This second rationale is captured in the concept of
“sin taxes,” which classifies many of the goods chosen as targets of selec-
tive excise taxes as goods which the government has a motivation to
decrease consumption of, usually justified by a health or moral con-
cern.72  In other words, the use of selective excise taxes has been ratio-
nalized as a method of government intervention “required to align
private costs more closely with social costs.”73  Instead of an outright
70. ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICA-
TIONS 102 (Jack W. Calhoun et al., eds., 4th ed. 2008).
71. Id. at 104.
72. Randall G. Holcombe, Selective Excise Taxation from an Interest-Group Perspective, in
TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 81, 81 (William F.
Shughart II ed., 1997) (noting that one of the three clear rationales for excise taxes devel-
oped by economic theory is that “[a]n excise tax can be placed on goods whose consump-
tion is considered to be undesirable . . . viewed as either a penalty for consuming the
good, a tax on a negative externality . . . or both”).
73. William F. Shughart II, Introduction and Overview, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDA-
TORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 1, 3 (William F. Shughart II ed., 1997) (arguing
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ban of the use of what the government considers an immoral or risky
good, a selective excise tax seeks to change the consumer’s behavior by
raising the price and “provid[ing] consumers with incentives to curtail
their purchases.”74
In summary, excise taxes have traditionally been justified as effi-
cient and effective means of raising revenue when applied to inelastic
goods.  Traditionally, many of these goods have been selected as the
object of the tax because the government has an underlying objective to
change consumer behavior, being of the type that the government con-
siders as posing a certain moral or health risk.  However, these tradi-
tional rationales and justifications are in tension with each other; most
selective excise taxes are traditionally levied against products consid-
ered to be harmful or immoral to society, so an increase in price is
meant to change behavior.  But, if this goal of the tax is successful and
consumers do change their spending habits, the tax does not raise the
revenue anticipated by government officials.  This tradeoff makes it
incredibly difficult to determine if an excise tax has “worked.”  In an
effort to perhaps provide reasoning that functions despite the tension
between those objectives, a final rationale has developed, which posits
that an excise tax can be applied as a substitute for a user fee, with the
proceeds earmarked for more desirable purposes (i.e. smokers pay
extra for cigarettes as a “fee” for the health risks their decision imposes
on the community).  This rationale, commonly used to defend the use
of an excise tax, justifies the traditional “sin tax” by holding that the
money raised by the tax will be used to help curb the social or moral
improprieties of the product itself, by earmarking it for such pur-
poses.75  “There is little doubt that taxpayers are more tolerant of a tax
increase if the stated objective is to reduce activities that are widely
frowned upon and to increase funding for projects or programs that
are widely believed to promote worthy objectives.”76  For example,
many of the state taxes on alcohol are earmarked for highway safety
programs, an area directly impacted by the negative externalities of
that government action is required because of the assumption that without it, the con-
sumption/use of certain products imposes costs on society that the consumer themselves
does not bear and which they do not take into account when making consumption deci-
sions; this is especially evident in the case of smokers, who do not necessarily think about
the negative externalities they impose on others because of second-hand smoke, so the
tax forces them to at least consider their decision to buy cigarettes and smoke because of
the increase in price, and if they decide they will smoke regardless of the moral/health
risks, they will bear the burden of their cost on society by bearing the burden of the tax).
74. Id.
75. See generally Dwight R. Lee, Overcoming Taxpayer Resistance by Taxing Choice and
Earmarking Revenues, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINA-
TION 105 (William F. Shughart II ed. 1997) (positing that because public desire for special
interest spending lines up with public opposition to government taxation, thus giving
both the government and public the general incentive to earmark revenues for purposes
desired by the public).
76. Id. at 106. These earmarked funds have also been coined as a “user fee” for the
consumer of the good.
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drinking and driving.77  This final rationale seems to attempt to strike a
balance between the government’s goal of raising revenue, and perhaps
the slightly less attainable, but desirable effect, of shifting consumption.
By earmarking funds from the tax for programs meant to curb the neg-
ative externalities of the select products’ consumption, the government
effectively takes a stance against the products’ use, while also raising
revenue—an arguably effective compromise between the traditionally
conflicting rationales typically cited for an excise tax.
In light of these traditional justifications of selective excise taxa-
tion, however, the tax on medical devices is challenging to rationalize.
While the tax will arguably effectively raise revenue, the extent of the
demand curves determining the elasticity for many medical devices
remain undetermined.  Many of the devices are arguably without ade-
quate substitutes in the market, making them inelastic goods by defini-
tion, but this does not completely tell the story in determining the
elasticity of the entire demand curve.  For example, if the manufactur-
ers were to pass on the economic burden of the tax to the patient/final
consumer, there are numerous situations where a patient might just
elect to not have a procedure done, or might even wait until alternative
options kick in, including Medicare coverage, cheaper prices, or other
alternatives, such as experimental treatments.78  This demand curve
will vary based on the type of medical device in question and the
options available to the consumer.  Of course this also highlights the
fact that it cannot yet be determined where the economic burden of the
tax will land.  Without good estimates of the relevant price elasticities, it
remains uncertain if the MDET will follow the traditional path of an
77. Id. With regard to benefit taxes, such as the highway motor fuels tax, the Ency-
clopedia of Taxation & Tax Policy describes the rationale for earmarking them as follows:
Earmarking finds its strongest equity rationale in the benefits connection, where
it extends the quid-pro-quo concept (the accepted basis for private market trans-
actions) into the tax-financed sector.  Dedication of highway user tax revenues
for highway purposes represents the benefit principle at its best (notwithstand-
ing the tenuous relationship between taxes paid and benefits received by differ-
ent categories of highway users).  The equity rationale for earmarking general
taxes finds its limit in the fact that there are very few services or facilities for
which there is a corresponding “earmarkable” tax.
Frederick Stocker, Earmarking of Taxes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA ON TAXATION & TAX POLICY
89, 90 (Joseph J. Cordes et al., 2d ed. 2005). See also George R. Crowley & Adam J. Hoffer,
The Effects of Dedicating Tax Revenues, 109 MERCATUS ON POLICY 1, 1 (2012) (positing that
“[t]heoretically, the process of dedicating tax revenues to specific expenditures should
have no impact on the composition of expenditures, because one dollar from one tax is
perfectly substitutable for one dollar from another,” but that the effects of earmarking tax
revenues have strong policy implications and dedicating tax revenues to specific projects
the public supports are popular methods used by policymakers to mask increases in gov-
ernment spending).
Other examples of earmarking include more broadly defined purposes, like revenues
received by schools districts being dedicated to education purposes, but also things like
gasoline and motor vehicle taxes, which are earmarked to fund road maintenance and
the ever contentious social security payroll taxes, earmarked for elderly insurance pur-
poses, but also for welfare/unemployment compensation.
78. This also raises the difficulty in defining the “consumer”—even if the economic
burden of the tax is passed on, who would it fall on (i.e. the patient, the insurance compa-
nies, or the hospitals) and what would the demand curves for each look like?
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excise tax in terms of being described as an indirect form of taxation
(i.e. the economic incidence of the tax is easily shifted from the manu-
facturer to the “consumer”), or not.
The MDET is also not adequately justified by the traditional ratio-
nale of a “sin tax” or a tax imposed to change consumption habits.  No
one would argue that the MDET is being imposed to encourage people
not to have medical procedures done or to discourage the use of bene-
ficial medical devices.  Many of these devices have helped save lives
through preventative measures or other means, while the rest arguably
have tended to produce only positive externalities.
Finally, in terms of earmarking funds, the argument is trickier.
Because the MDET pretty clearly does not purport to be a “sin tax,” at
least in the traditional sense of trying to change consumer behavior,
negative externalities are harder to identify and define.  In an attempt
to do so, however, arguably it would be fair to look at what the funds
were earmarked for.  But problems arise here as well, since tracing the
revenue raised by the MDET leads to a general fund managed by the
United States Treasury Department.79
Taken collectively, it remains challenging, if not impractical, to
attempt to justify the MDET by the traditional rationales of an excise
tax.
B. Industry Concerns
In addition to its lack of conformity with traditional justifications
for selective excise taxation, the medical device industry has voiced a
number of other concerns with the tax that go beyond the economic
theories used to justify its structure.  These practical concerns, commu-
nicated by industry lobbyists, must be discussed (and potentially
addressed) in assessing the efficiency of the selective excise tax struc-
ture.  Among the problems asserted by the medical device industry are
the following, to be discussed below: (1) the demand for medical
devices will drop if the price increases to reflect the MDET; (2) the
increased cost of the MDET will force companies to (a) lay off workers
and (b) reduce spending on innovation; (3) smaller companies will not
be able to survive the cost increase of the tax; and (4) the costs of the
tax on the industry will so substantially outweigh the benefits that it will
have a crippling effect on the industry (i.e. driving firms overseas, forc-
ing towns centered around these companies to disappear, etc.).  In dis-
cussing the potential effects of the tax on the medical device industry, it
must be noted that the final impact will depend largely on whom the
economic burden of the tax falls upon.  While a shift of the economic
79. This is not to say that a general fund in the Treasury Department cannot be
earmarked to achieve the traditional goals of curbing the negative externalities or benefit-
ting programs meant to do so.  For example, social security payroll taxes are also depos-
ited in a general fund at the Treasury.  But from there, the funds are earmarked and
made accessible to the states only when they have shown proof that the funds they receive
will be used for one of the two primary purposes of social security taxes.  No such
earmarking has been established for the MDET at this time. See generally Ewan Clague &
Joel Gordon, Earmarking Tax Funds for Welfare Purposes, 3 SOC. SEC. BULL. 10 (1940).
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burden of the tax from manufacturers to consumers may mitigate many
of the negative impacts discussed below, it does not negate the fact that
these concerns must be addressed to fully answer the question of
whether this tax structure is the “best” choice.
The medical device industry asserts that the demand for medical
devices will drop if they are forced to raise the price of their goods.
This argument assumes that the consumer, in experiencing an increase
in the price of medical devices, would decrease their demand for such
products.  In other words, the assumption is based on the theory that
the demand curve for medical devices is relatively elastic.80  Yet eco-
nomic research shows that healthcare related spending is relatively
inelastic;81 in other words, when prices have increased, the demand
only falls by a fraction of the price increase.82  This would seem to
imply that even a large increase in the price of medical devices would
have a relatively small effect on demand, since many medical devices
arguably have few adequate substitutes and many are considered “nec-
essary” for the patient.83  However, even if the entire burden of the tax
were to be shouldered by the consumer, the medical device industry
arguably overstates the impact the price increase might have on con-
sumer behavior, regardless of the slope of the demand curve, because
the MDET actually tends to be a relatively small share of the price of the
taxed product, especially relative to other excise taxes.84  While the
industry concerns are not unfounded (demand for some devices with
adequate substitutes or those considered “optional” might decrease
with an increase in price), their effect appears to be overstated, such
that an increase in price of medical devices would not cause the devas-
tating effect of a large shift in demand that the industry lobbyists have
implied.
“The medical device tax is a tax on jobs.”85  This leading argument
by the medical device industry lobbyists posits that to offset the revenue
loss due to the excise tax, manufacturers will have to lay off tens of
80. An elastic demand curve assumes that an increase in the price of a good will
cause consumers to shift their consumption away from the product.  This might typically
be the case for products that have adequate and available substitutes, and are not consid-
ered necessities.
81. GRAVELLE & LOWRY, supra note 26, at 14.
82. A 2006 review of the economic literature by Mathematica Policy Research found
the price elasticity of overall health services range from -0.04 to -0.75, but centered
around -0.2; this translates to an indication that if health care costs were to increase by ten
percent, customers/patients would be anticipated to only reduce their total health care
spending by two percent. SU LIU & DEBORAH CHOLLET, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH,
INC., PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITY OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH
CARE SERVICES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 34 (2006).
83. Of course this would also vary depending on the device needed and the condi-
tion of the patient.
84. GRAVELLE & LOWRY, supra note 26, at 4 (“Federal cigarette taxes are estimated to
be around 16% of the retail price, but if measured on the same basis as the medical
device and other taxes (before state and local taxes and on price net of the tax) the tax is
more than 36%.”).
85. Michael Ramlet et al., The Economic Impact of the Medical Device Excise Tax, AM.
ACTION  F.  (June 4, 2012), http://americanactionforum.org/uploads/files/research/
The_Economic_Impact_of_the_Medical_Device_Excise_Tax.pdf.
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thousands of workers.86  The industry itself is massive in the United
States; in 2008 alone, the medical device industry employed 422,778
workers, who were paid over $24.6 billion in earnings.87  Although the
actual impact remains to be determined, lobbyists have already begun
pointing to companies who have laid off workers in the industry.88
Others point to reports like the one by Diana Furchtgott-Roth, which
estimated the tax would prompt the loss of 45,661 jobs,89 or groups like
the American Action Forum, which estimated around 14,500 jobs
would be lost because of the tax.90  The direct effect of the tax on
industry jobs remains undetermined—some employers have cited the
MDET as one of many reasons for laying off workers—but the numbers
across the industry have remained low thus far and the reports that
have estimated job loss in the tens of thousands have been found to use
questionable methodology.91  Once again, while the argument is not
86. Id. It remains unclear if this argument is based on the assumption that the man-
ufacturers will bear the burden of the excise tax or if it matters in the long run because
the initial hit by the tax will have the same impact alleged. See also Devon Herrick, The Job-
Killing Medical Device Tax, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncpa
.org/pdfs/ib106.pdf.
87. The Lewin Group, State Economic Impact of the Medical Technology Industry,
ADVANCED MED. TECH. ASS’N (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.lewin.com/~/media/
Lewin/Site_Sections/Publications/StateEconomicImpactoftheMedicalTechnologyIndus
try61510.pdf.
88. For example, Stryker Corporation was cited as one of the major medical device
companies who announced in November 2011 that they would be laying off 1,000 work-
ers, or about five percent of their workforce in anticipation of the tax.  Numerous news
sources reported that the layoffs were made solely in advance of the MDET, but the press
release from Stryker cites other reasons, such as “continued investment in strategic areas
and drive growth despite the ongoing challenging economic environment and market
slowdown in elective procedures,” and it was well-known in the industry that the company
was in financial trouble prior to any effects by the tax.  Press Release, Stryker Corporation,
Stryker Announces Actions to Drive Over $100 Million in Annual Productivity Gains
(Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=118965&p=
irol-newsArticle&ID=1629222.
89. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, supra note 27, at 9, 21. The methodol-
ogy of the report remains unclear and the data produced in this report has been ques-
tioned by numerous credible sources, but the information contained in the report
continues to be cited.
90. Ramlet et al., supra note 85 (14,500 is based on estimations made by both the
Joint Committee on Taxation and historical industry data).
91. See Van de Water, supra note 61.  The article points out that studies like the one
sponsored by AdvaMed and used to estimate the job loss total at 39,000 jobs due to the
MDET was based on flawed methodology. It points out that Battelle, which carried out
the study for AdvaMed, used an “input-output” model to conclude the hypothetical eco-
nomic event (an estimated $3 billion loss in revenues to the medical industry) would
result in a little fewer than 40,000 jobs being lost.  The problem is, there is no reason to
think that the medical industry will actually lose $3 billion in revenues, from a loss of sales
of the devices themselves—this would only happen if the goods were completely elastic,
which they are not.  Based on an elasticity of 0.2 of medical devices, the report overesti-
mates the revenues losses by a factor of five.  In addition, a straight input-output model
ignores important related changes like government’s fiscal or monetary policy, which
would have a large impact.
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unfounded, the estimated results of the tax on industry jobs appear to
be grossly overstated.92
The industry has emphasized that, in addition to a loss of jobs, the
cost incurred by the MDET will force companies to reduce spending on
innovation.  Much the same as the argument reflecting job loss because
of the tax, this concern posits that the increased cost of the tax on man-
ufacturers will in turn cause them to cut or scale back their budgets for
research and development (“R&D”).  Reports, such as those from Ben-
jamin Zycher, a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute, have esti-
mated that the tax will force the medical device industry to cut
spending on R&D by over $2 billion a year.93  This seems staggering in
an industry that is known for its large R&D spending, but the truth of
the impact seems to be similar to the job-loss argument; the tax could
force companies to cut some R&D spending, but the estimated results
by the industry appear to be largely overstated.  Spending on R&D in
recent years has slowed for reasons entirely unrelated to the tax. The
Economist wrote “device companies have sustained themselves by making
small improvements to existing products. Spending on R&D has so far
failed to yield many truly innovative devices.”94  Other sources have
cited a general decrease in the amount of investment funds available
for manufacturing firms,95 as well as a wealth of inefficiencies in the
healthcare market that have slowed R&D expenditures, prior to the
tax.96  But if the MDET is to join the ranks of other reasons for the cuts
on spending in R&D, it will first have to be determined who is saddled
with the burden of paying the tax.97  Thus, the effect of the MDET on
R&D spending will largely depend on who bears the economic burden
of the tax.  However, even if the burden remains fully with the manufac-
turer, the story about why spending on R&D may be cut is not fully told
92. Pugh, supra note 60. The article cited expert Eugene Kiely, director of Fact-
sCheck.org, a nonpartisan, nonprofit government watchdog project of the Annenberg
Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.  Kiely noted that “[w]e couldn’t
even come up with tens of thousands of jobs that are being lost here in the United States”
in the context of the overblown job effects being cited.
93. Zycher’s report is no longer available online, but it is referenced in documents
produced by the Advanced Medical Technology Association. See Summaries of Key Device
Tax Studies and Reports, ADVANCED MED. TECH. ASS’N (May 22, 2012), http://advamed
.org/res.download/19.
94. Left to Their Own Devices: Medtronic and the Woes of America’s Medical-Technology
Industry, ECONOMIST, (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528644
(hereinafter “Left to Their Own Devices”).
95. See The U.S. Medical Device Industry in 2012: Challenges at Home and Abroad, MED.
DEVICE AND DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (July 17, 2012); Medical Technology Innovation Scorecard: The
Race for Global Leadership, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (Jan. 2011), http://pwchealth
.com/cgi-local/hregister.cgi/reg/innovation-scorecard.pdf; Ramlet et al., supra note 85.
96. Left to Their Own Devices, supra note 94 (listing numerous problems affecting the
medical device industry, including, but not limited to, “recalls, stingy customers, [and]
anxious regulators); Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, Redefining Competi-
tion in Healthcare, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (2004) (citing zero-sum competition, a focus on
local markets, and inefficient strategies and structures as major issues within the medical
device industry).
97. In other words, effects on small as well as large firms will likely be minimal if the
tax is expected to be passed on in price and the decrease in demand would be negligible.
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by the tax alone.  Once again, it appears that giving a blanket amount
of billions of dollars lost on innovation in the industry overstates and
oversimplifies the problem.
Claims have been made that small firms in the medical device
industry will be disproportionately affected by the excise tax.  This argu-
ment, if true, would appear to be especially pertinent, given that a vast
majority of the medical technology firms in the United States are con-
sidered small-sized firms; in 2007, seventy-three percent of the medical
device companies in the U.S. had fewer than twenty employees,98 and
in 2011, eighty-five percent of the companies had fewer than twenty
employees.99  The medical device industry argues that these smaller
business and startups in the medical device industry will have greater
difficulty adapting to the excise tax burden because the structure of the
tax favors larger companies who are better positioned to absorb the lost
revenue as a result of lower fixed costs and larger cash reserves.100
However, this argument presumes that these smaller companies are
also those with narrower margins.  Being small in size (i.e. number of
employees, or devices, etc.) is not why a company will necessarily strug-
gle with the tax.  It will depend on the margins; the tax is applied to
sales revenue, and not profits, so you can imagine a situation in which a
small company, based on the number of employees, or the number of
devices made, is making significant profit margins based on their invest-
ment in/production of one lucrative device. It is accordingly mislead-
ing to say that a small company, just for being small in size, will suffer
disproportionately from the tax.
The medical device industry has relied on statistics, studies, and
reports they have self-produced, to argue that the cost of the tax will
have a crippling effect on the industry.  News sites have run stories
about the devastating effects the MDET could have on towns bolstered
by the medical device industry.  For example, Fox News ran a story in
October 2013, on two medical device companies, Iconacy and
OrthoPediatrics, whose CEOs were quoted saying “[t]here are estimates
that over 40,000 jobs will be impacted” and that Warsaw, IN, where both
companies were located “is known for its medical device companies,
[and thus] the tax could also have a profound effect on both the com-
munity and the state of Indiana.”101  These reports, stories, and state-
ments, however, should not be taken at face value.  Many of the reports
and studies have been undermined for their methodology, and many of
the statistics have been found to be grossly overestimated.102  Although
many of the problems identified by the medical device industry are
98. 2011 Annual Survey of Manufacturers, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ASM_2011_31GS201&prodType=table (2011 is the most recent year in which this data is
available).
99. Id.
100. Ramlet et al., supra note 85.
101. Gabrielle Karol, Medical Device Leaders: Don’t Hurt Job Growth with ObamaCare
Tax, FOX BUSINESS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/business-leaders/2013/
10/21/medical-device-leaders-dont-hurt-job-growth-with-obamacare-tax/.
102. Van de Water, supra note 61.
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valid and may potentially have an impact on the industry itself, the
extent of the effects cannot be predicted with complete accuracy.  But
just one year into the tax’s implementation, it appears the estimated
effects have been largely overstated.  The tax is still new and in its early
stages of application; it will take time before we know more determina-
tive effects of the tax, but it should be reemphasized that while many of
the arguments made above are valid, they will depend significantly on
who bears the economic burden of the tax.  And yet even without such
knowledge, it appears that the predicted effects of the tax by the indus-
try lobbyists have been largely overstated.
C. The Federal Government’s Response
Determining if a tax is effective depends entirely on how you
define the term.  Most economists, especially those in public finance,
find it preferable to raise revenue by taxing a broad base at a low rate in
order to maximize the amount of revenue, while reducing the distor-
tions to the economy.103  The opposite of this broad-based tax struc-
ture, however, is a selective excise tax.  Thus, effectiveness of an excise
tax is often defined by its traditional rationales—in particular, excise
taxes are often considered effective if they are able to change or affect
the behavior of the consumer.  In other words, (1) was the tax passed
onto the consumer, and if so, (2) how much did consumption
decrease?  But as we have established above, the MDET is challenging
to justify with such traditional rationales associated with an excise tax. It
does not appear that the tax has been established to incentivize a
change in consumer behavior.  If we cannot effectively define the influ-
ences behind the use of an excise tax using traditional rationales, then
it arguably does not make sense to try and define the tax’s effectiveness
based on such rationales.  Based on this, how can the effectiveness of
the tax be defined?
Many supporters of the MDET would label the tax as an effective
one purely based on the amount of revenue it could raise for the
healthcare reform.  But the MDET was certainly not the only option
proposed to raise funds for the ACA.  In a congressional research
report from 2009, alternative tax options were identified as potential
revenue raisers, including many that came close to or exceeded the esti-
mated $39 billion in revenue from the MDET.104  Ultimately Congress
elected to fund the ACA through several sources of revenue; funding
for the ACA will come from both cuts in government spending and new
revenue sources, including the MDET.105  The $39 billion estimated in
revenue from the MDET is merely a fraction of the estimated $1.634
103. Tax Policy Nuts and Bolts: Understanding the Tax Base and Tax Rate, INST. ON
TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Aug. 2011), http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/pb50bolts.pdf.
104. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40648, TAX OPTIONS FOR FINANC-
ING HEALTH CARE REFORM (2010). The alternative tax options included, but were not
limited to, excise taxes on alcohol and non-diet sweetened beverages, reducing the index-
ing of the rate brackets to the Consumer Price Index, increasing the capital gains tax,
numerous financial accounting standards, payroll tax increases, or a new value-added tax.
105. Kliff, supra note 50.
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trillion necessary for the funding of the healthcare reform.106  This
means that only about two percent of the revenue to fund the ACA will
come from the revenue raised by the MDET over the next decade.
Some would argue (primarily the medical device industry) that this
small percentage could be raised in other ways less harmful to the medi-
cal device industry.  On the other hand, without evidence of who the
burden of the tax will fall upon, or what benefits the industry will gain
from the additional healthcare coverage, it cannot be argued that the
tax is not fairly placed on an industry that could benefit from the ACA.
Many proponents of the MDET rely on “fairness” in defining the
effectiveness of the MDET.  The argument here is three-fold.  First, the
biggest proponents of the MDET argue that the tax is “fair” because it
purports to tax an industry that may receive quite a windfall from the
additional customer base brought about by implementing the ACA.  If
such a windfall does occur, the effect of the tax on manufacturers may
ultimately be negligible.  Second, the supporters of the tax argue that in
addition to the potential benefits the medical device industry may gain
from the ACA, the industry is one that can afford the cost of the tax.
The large profit margins of some of the most vocal companies certainly
support this argument, but across the industry, this argument holds if
the burden of the tax is able to be shifted from the manufacturer to the
consumer.  This brings us to the third justification for the “fairness” of
the tax on the industry—imposed oversight of an industry that arguably
operates with substantial, unchecked control over the pricing of their
products in the market.  The medical device industry, as discussed, sup-
plies goods that generally have few, if any, adequate substitutes.  Thus,
the industry largely operates with a monopoly over the price in the mar-
ket.  Because of this market control, the medical device manufacturers
may have an easier time passing the burden of the tax on by raising the
price of the devices.  While not much may be done about this ease in
shifting the burden to the final consumer, the implementation of the
necessary administrative and compliance costs related to the tax may
open the market up to further regulation and/or oversight of the price
control in the market.  These arguments support the proposition that
the tax is effective because it is being fairly administered to the medical
device industry.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the tax will not be fully determina-
ble until several years after it has been introduced to the market.  Only
time will tell who bears the economic burden of the tax, and whether
106. Id.  The other sources discussed in this article are broken into two groups: cuts
in government spending and new provisions designed to generate revenue for the expan-
sion in healthcare coverage.  All of these charges are also discussed in a 2012 Congres-
sional Budget office report. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director,
Congressional Budget Office, to Honorable John Boehner, Speaker of the House, U.S.
House of Representatives (July 24, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/43471-hr6079.pdf, whose information was later updated gen-
erally by U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
2014 TO 2024 (2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attach
ments/45010-Outlook2014_Feb.pdf (pay particular attention to Appendix B).
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the government’s predicted external benefits to the medical device
industry become a reality.
III. DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE MDET
Based on the limited amount of data available at this time, it would
be both impractical and perhaps misleading to make substantial claims
regarding either the impact or the effectiveness of the MDET.  The tax
has survived numerous attempts at repeal107 and appears to be sticking
around, at least for the time being.  Without making an argument
either for or against repeal/reform at this time, this Note posits that the
tax ought to be reassessed in the future to determine if the tax structure
is appropriate or if there stands to reason certain justifications for
reform or repeal.
There are two competing stories circulated about the MDET. To
determine if the tax has been successful and/or efficient, or if it ought
to be considered for reform or repeal, requires that one of the compet-
ing stories be adopted; either (1) the medical device industry is correct
that the application of the MDET does more harm than good to the
industry and that reform/repeal ought to be a serious consideration, or
(2) the federal government will be correct in their prediction that a
windfall from the ACA will balance the cost of the tax on the industry.
Within each of these predictions exists the underlying tension men-
tioned throughout this Note; the impact of the MDET will depend
heavily on who ultimately bears the economic burden of the tax.  Thus,
the success of each side’s justifications for or against the tax depends
heavily on who will “pay” for the tax.
The crux of the arguments made by both the federal government
and the medical device industry appear to assume that the economic
impact of the MDET will remain with the manufacturers.  The federal
government seems to assert that the cost of the MDET on the medical
device manufacturers is justified by a windfall the industry will receive
from the influx of patients mandated to receive healthcare insurance
under the ACA; the medical device industry, on the other hand, alleges
the MDET will have a crippling effect on the industry, by forcing firms
to cut jobs, innovation and maybe their entire operation altogether.108
If the economic burden is to remain with the manufacturer (i.e. the tax
is not passed on by an increase in the price of the devices sold), then it
remains to be seen whose prediction would ring true.109
On the other hand, if the economic burden of the tax is shifted
from the manufacturers to the consumers, both the arguments by the
107. NOLAN, supra note 47, at 11–12.
108. See supra Part II.B.
109. Arguably both sides have largely overstated the effect the MDET might have in
this scenario, as presented through earlier evidence in this Note. The predictions from
the medical device industry seem to be overblown, relying on misinformed and overesti-
mated data, while the government’s argument is undercut by arguments that the people
mandated to retain health insurance through the ACA will not be the type of people who
will need many of the devices covered by the MDET (and thus the ACA would not con-
tribute to a windfall because no substantial increase in the patient numbers would occur).
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federal government and the medical device industry could be poten-
tially undermined.  The federal government’s windfall justification for
the MDET would not be moot if the tax’s economic burden were
shifted to the consumer because the medical device industry could be
earning a higher margin on their sales (which would be taxed by the
MDET), but such a result could make it more difficult for the govern-
ment to explain their decision to tax in this way.  In other words, if the
government uses the windfall justification as their reasoning to use a
selective excise tax, then it would be difficult to explain why they struc-
tured the tax in such a way that it was not the manufacturers, those
earning the windfall, who are paying for the tax, but rather the con-
sumer (the people providing the windfall!).  The medical device indus-
try would also be faced with their argument being seriously
undermined if the economic burden of the tax were shifted to the con-
sumer.  If the tax can merely be shifted by an increase in the price of
the devices, the tax, in the long run, should have little to no negative
effects on the industry itself, thus undermining their arguments that
the tax unfairly burdens them.
In conclusion, a reassessment of the tax will depend heavily on
where the economic burden of the tax falls.  If the burden remains on
the manufacturer, either the government or the medical device indus-
try’s arguments may be assessed to determine the fairness of the tax on
the industry.  But if the economic burden of the tax is shifted to the
consumer, the reassessment of the tax becomes much trickier, for the
following reasons:  First, it would need to be determined to whom the
economic burden of the tax has been passed; are the insurance compa-
nies paying the higher prices or are the patients facing the upturn in
prices for both the devices and the procedures they involve?  Second,
the amount of the burden would need to be considered; in a relatively
unregulated market, the manufacturers have a monopoly on produc-
tion and thus could potentially raise prices.  It would have to be deter-
mined how much prices had increased.  And finally, it would need to be
determined what effect the increase in prices was having.  If the prices
were so great for the individual consumer that they were electing not to
have important procedures for cost-related reasons, that would be a jus-
tification for a reassessment of the tax structure.
It remains to be seen how the cost of the MDET will be divided
among the affected parties; it will take time to determine where the
economic burden of the tax lands and how that cost will affect all par-
ties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the adamant arguments from both the medical device
industry and the U.S. federal government, determining the fate of the
MDET is best left for future discussions.  While both sides present valid
arguments, it may be the case that neither is correct, or that both have
overstated their positions.  This discussion, however, is heavily depen-
dent on where the economic burden of the tax falls.  Thus, it will only
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be once enough time has passed that we will know who is truly “paying”
for the MDET.  Only then may the effectiveness of each side’s argu-
ments be properly addressed and the future of the MDET be known.
